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Anatomy of an Aggregate Settlement: 
The Triumph of Temptation over Ethics 
Lester Brickman* 
ABSTRACT 
This Essay explores the ethical issues that arise for plaintiffs' lawyers in-
volved in nonclass aggregate settlements. Rule l.B(g) of the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct requires that each client in an aggregate settle-
ment must give their informed consent to the settlement amount allocated to 
them by their lawyer. This Essay argues that lawyers' fees in some aggregate 
settlements are of such a magnitude that they simply overwhelm any proclivity 
of lawyers to adhere to the rule. The Essay uses the Phillips Petroleum litiga-
tion as an example of the more egregious results of perverse incentives created 
by fees of that magnitude. 
We know little about nonclass aggregate settlements, and what 
little we do know is unsettling. The American Law Institute's 
("ALI") proposal in the Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation 
to amend ABA Model Rule l.8(g)1 to allow use of advance waivers-
accommodating lawyers' interests-has provoked intense debate, but 
sheds little light on lawyers' actual practices.2 We do not know, even 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. 
1 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDU= R. l.8(g) (2008). 
2 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF AGGREGATE L1TIG. § 3.17 (2010). The ALI states that the 
"purpose of modifying the strict requirements of the aggregate-settlement rule is to facilitate 
large-scale settlements that may have been impeded by the mechanical application of the aggre-
gate-settlement rule to a substantial multiparty settlement." Id.§ 3.17 cmt. (c)(l). The principal 
beneficiaries of this change will be lawyers specializing in mass torts. The ALI is often accom-
modative of lawyers' interests. Consider the ALi's position on whether a party to an agreement 
which is unenforceable on public policy grounds can nonetheless obtain restitution or quantum 
meruit. The ALI is of two minds. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that, for an 
agreement to be unenforceable on public policy grounds, the interests in enforcing the agree-
ment must be "clearly outweighed" by a public policy against enforcement. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CoNTRA=s § 178(1) (1981 ); see also Alex B. Long, Attorney-Client Fee Agreements that 
Offend Public Policy, 61 S.C. L. REv. 287, 292 (2009). It goes on to articulate the relevant 
factors that need to be balanced in reaching a conclusion. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoN-
TRA=s § 178(2) (1981). If a contract is unenforceable on public policy grounds, the general rule 
is that there can be no quantum meruit recovery by one who has rendered performance. See 
JOHN D. CALAMARI & JosEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CoNTRA=s 833 (4th ed. 1998). The 
Restatement takes the position that restitution should be the exception, rather than the norm, 
under these circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRA=s § 197 (1981). The po-
sition adopted by the ALI in the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers is contrary. 
Here, the rule adopted is that if a fee agreement between a lawyer and client is unenforceable, 
the lawyer is nonetheless entitled to the fair value of her services unless the lawyer has engaged 
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approximately, how many nonclass aggregate settlements take place 
annually, the number of clients represented, the amounts paid by de-
fendants, the fees that are charged, whether clients are provided with 
the requisite information so that their consent is informed, and what 
methods lawyers use to allocate the settlements among the clients 
(such as a matrix based on injury severity and type, age, residence, 
etc.). In my experience, there is often a reason for the lack of infor-
mation about certain lawyers' practices. The less that is known about 
a practice, the less it is scrutinized, and that suits the practitioners just 
fine. 
Most of what little we do know is due to allegations of serious 
lawyer misconduct in administering nonclass aggregate settlements. 
My fellow panelist, Howard Erichson, has provided a detailed descrip-
tion of six such aggregate settlements for us to consider, five of which 
involve alleged lawyer malfeasance.3 A key question is whether these 
five are aberrations or whether they are merely the tip of an iceberg, 
at the base of which, below our visibility line, lies lawyer malfeasance 
on a grand scale. 
According to Erichson, the principal culprit accounting for lawyer 
malfeasance in this area is the all-or-nothing settlement.4 This is 
where a lawyer files individual claims on behalf of a large number of 
clients who all claim to have been similarly injured by a single defen-
dant and the defendant agrees to pay a single and often substantial 
in a "clear and serious violation of duty to a client." REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW Gov-
ERNING LAWYERS §§ 37, 39 (2000). Professor Joseph Perillo characterizes this position as "law-
yer-friendly." Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Lawyer's Contracts ls Different, 67 FORDHAM L. 
REv. 443, 447 (1998). Thus, even when a lawyer engages in a "clear and serious violation of a 
duty to the client," RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GovERNING LAWYERS § 37 (2000), the 
lawyer may still collect a fee, a privilege that Professor Perillo points out is not extended to 
"(o)ther fiduciaries." Perillo, supra, at 447-48; see also Long, supra, at 296-97. Professor Alex 
B. Long points out another way in which the ALi's position is lawyer-friendly. In deciding 
whether to enforce a contract or to permit restitution if a provision in the contract is unenforce-
able on public policy grounds, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts directs courts to take the 
public interest into account. See Long, supra, at 297. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Gov-
erning Lawyers largely ignores the public interest and focuses almost exclusively on the parties 
to the contract-the lawyer and the client. See id. at 298. By turning a blind eye to issues that 
transcend those of the attorney and client, the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Law-
yers makes it more difficult to justify any fee forfeiture by the lawyer. Id. at 299. 
3 See Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 U. KAN. L. 
REv. 979 (2010). The five cases that involve alleged lawyer malfeasance are the Kentucky fen-
phen settlement, the Napoli fen-phen settlement, the Locks fen-phen settlement, the Leeds 
Morelli settlements, and the Phillips chemical plant explosion settlement. 
4 See id. at 980 ("All-or-nothing settlements, however, cause a lot of mischief."); see also 
id. at 983 ("All-or-nothing settlements systematically and predictably create opportunities for 
abuse."). 
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sum ( as opposed to individual amounts for each client which are then 
totaled up) to settle the claims, provided all of the lawyer's clients sign 
releases. Erichson lists a litany of ills resulting from the all-or-nothing 
settlement, including creating and exacerbating conflicts of interest, 
creating incentives to misallocate funds, the risk of strategic holdouts, 
and making slush funds in anticipation of the need to buy off the hold-
outs. This type of settlement also creates incentives for lawyers to 
misrepresent the nature of the settlement in order to gain clients' con-
sent and to collude with the defendant to secure that consent.5 
Erichson's solution is to avoid all-or-nothing settlements in order 
to neutralize the holdout risk and its attendant evils and instead to 
enter into most-or-nothing settlements, that is, settlements in which 
only eighty-five to ninety-five percent of the clients are required to 
sign releases in order for the settlement to go into effect.6 He argues 
that these should be acceptable to most defendants, raise far fewer 
ethical concerns, and minimize the holdout risk and the ethically dubi-
ous conduct that it generates.7 
Erichson's argument strikes me as on target with one notable ex-
ception. He states that most-or-nothing settlements do not "present 
as strong a risk of collusion or disloyalty" as do all-or-nothing settle-
ments.8 I dissent. I contend that the risk of collusion between counsel 
and the defendant is not a function of the all-or-nothing settlement, 
but rather the lucrative nature of this area of practice, which is, in 
part, a result of the lack of enforcement of ethics rules that purport to 
limit lawyers' fees to "reasonable" amounts.9 Put plainly, my thesis-
as expressed in a previous article-is that when "money talks, ethics 
walks."10 
We are all familiar with the power of money to influence national 
policymaking. In recent months, we have seen an awesome display of 
that power in the halls of Congress with reference to fashioning solu-
tions to healthcare issues and regulation of financial markets. Money 
exerts a similar influence on the application of ethical principles to 
lucrative litigations. 
5 See id. at 1006--07; see also PR~CIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.17 cmt. b 
(2010). 
6 See Erichson, supra note 3, at 1023. 
7 See id. at 1024. 
8 Id. 
9 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.5(a) (2008). 
10 Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contingency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics Walks, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 247 (1996). 
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This point was driven home for me a few years ago when I led an 
effort to obtain an ethics opinion from the ABA Committee on Ethics 
and Professional Responsibility regarding the increasing practice of 
plaintiffs' lawyers negotiating their fees directly with defendants.11 
Consider an example cited in the letter to the ABA Committee that 
goes to the heart of the issue: 
An attorney comes to her client and indicates that she has 
received a settlement offer in the amount of $100,000. Hav-
ing hoped for a higher recovery, the client expresses his dis-
appointment, especially considering that his net recovery 
after the contingency fee will be two-thirds of that amount. 
The attorney tells the client that he should not be concerned 
with the fee because she and the defendant's insurance com-
pany have privately negotiated an agreement establishing the 
size and mode of payment of her fee, so that the client will 
not have to pay any fee at all. "It's all been taken care of by 
me and the defendant," the attorney tells her client. 
"There's nothing for you to worry about." Clearly, the client 
in such a scenario does have something to worry about, and 
will and should be less confident in his attorney's loyalty to 
him.12 
The letter went on to state that cases in which the plaintiff's attor-
ney negotiates his fee directly with the defendant 
are occurring with increasing frequency and upon a dramati-
cally increasing scale, with the legal stakes often totaling mil-
lions and even billions of dollars. The problem is amplified 
in the class action context where the class is even more de-
pendent on the judgment of the attorney when it comes to 
accepting the terms of a settlement.13 
The ethical issues raised by the potential self-dealing described in 
the letter to the ABA Committee are accentuated by the inclusion of 
provisions in class actions and other large-scale settlement agreements 
designed to bulletproof the fee agreements from both judicial and cli-
ent scrutiny. For example, in the tobacco litigations brought by state 
attorneys general in partnership, with private attorneys hired on a 
11 See Letter from Richard Abel, Michael J . Connell Professor of Law Emeritus, UCLA 
Sch. of Law, et al., to Stephen C. Krane, Chairman, Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof! Respon-
sibility, Am. Bar Ass'n (Sept. 17, 2007) [hereinafter ABA Letter], available at http://www.car-
dozo.yu.edu/uploadedFiles/Cardozo/Profiles/brickman-436/ABA %20Ethics%20Letter%20 
September%2017%202007%20Edited(1).pdf. 
12 Id. at 4- 5. 
13 Id. at 5. 
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contingency fee basis-functionally, an aggregative litigation-the 
monies that the states were to receive under the settlement agree-
ments were contingent upon the ratification of the agreement negoti-
ated by the contingency fee lawyers directly with the tobacco 
companies.14 This device enabled the private lawyers effectively to in-
sulate their multimillion- and billion-dollar fees from any ethical in-
quiry into their reasonableness. When, in a few cases, the fees were 
contested, state attorneys general successfully urged the rejection of 
even an inquiry because that would jeopardize the flow of settlement 
monies to the state.15 In class action litigation, class counsel have in-
creasingly negotiated fee agreements with defendants that provide 
that, in the event the fee is reduced by a court, that amount is credited 
to the defendant and not to class members. This has increased courts' 
propensities to ratify such fee agreements without serious considera-
tion because any reduction would not benefit the class.16 
Given these practices, the signatories to the letter17 urged the 
ABA Committee to declare that it is per se unethical for plaintiffs' 
attorneys to agree to any provision in agreements settling large-scale 
and aggregative litigations that in any way compromises the right of 
the clients or classes to recover fees deemed excessive or unethical by 
such review. 
What was the ABA Committee's response? Well, they ducked 
the request, stating that those ethical issues should be left up to the 
14 See W. Kip Viscusi, Tobacco: Regulation and Taxation Through Litigation, in REGULA-
TION THROUGH LITIGATION 22, 23, 42 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002); Joseph A. Califano, Jr. , To-
bacco: The Moral Issues, AMERICA, Aug. 15, 1998, at 7, 9. 
15 See, e.g., State v. Philip Morris, Inc., 763 N.Y.S.2d 32, 41-42 (App. Div. 2003) (vacating 
trial court's order enjoining the payment of attorney's fees); see also Jonathan D. Glater, Judge 
Questions Legal Fees in New York Tobacco Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2003, at Cl. 
16 In the vast majority of cases, federal judges ultimately award class counsel about ninety 
percent of what they request as fees. See Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller & Michael Per-
ino, A New Look at Judicial Impact: Attorneys' Fees in Securities Class Action After Goldberger 
v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 29 WAsH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 5, 22 (2009). 
17 Richard Abel, UCLA School of Law; David Barnhizer, Cleveland-Marshall College of 
Law; Lester Brickman, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; Robert Cochran, Pepperdine Uni-
versity School of Law; Roger Cramton, Cornell University Law School; Leonard Gross, South-
ern Illinois University School of Law; Allison Hayward, George Mason University School of 
Law; Michael Horowitz, Hudson Institute; Michael Krauss, George Mason University School of 
Law; Lisa G. Lerman, The Catholic University of America; Judith Maute, The University of 
Oklahoma College of Law; Tom Morgan, The George Washington University Law School; Jef-
frey O'Connell, University of Virginia School of Law; Deborah Rhode, Stanford Law School; 
Howard Rosenberg, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; Ronald Rotunda, George Ma-
son University School of Law; George Schatzki, Arizona State University College of Law; Peter 
H. Schuck, Yale Law School; William Simon, Columbia Law School; and Bradley Wendel, Cor-
nell University Law School. See ABA Letter, supra note 11, at 30. 
2011] ANATOMY OF AN AGGREGATE SETTLEMENT 705 
courts18-the very institution that has often relegated ethical enforce-
ment to an afterthought. 
Another example of how rules of ethics are mown down by the 
power of money is the hiring of screening companies by plaintiffs' law-
yers to generate hundreds of thousands of claimants in the asbestos, 
silica, fen-phen, silicone breast implant, and welding fume mass tort 
litigations.19 These litigation screenings have no intended health ben-
efit; they are conducted solely to obtain mass numbers of litigants and 
to generate mostly bogus medical records to support the claims.20 The 
first order of business when a potential litigant attends a litigation 
screening is to sign a retainer agreement with the law firm sponsoring 
the screening.21 I estimate that approximately 1.5 million potential lit-
igants have participated in these litigation screenings;22 that a compar-
ative handful of litigation doctors have found that approximately 1 
million of those screened had the requisite condition to confer a right 
of compensation;23 that approximately 900,000 of these claims were 
based on medical reports that were, in the words of Judge Janis Jack, 
"manufactured for money";24 that the settlement value of these claims 
is in the range of $35 to $40 billion;25 that the contingency fees gener-
ated are in the range of $13 to $14 billion;26 and finally, that the litiga-
tion doctors, sonographers, X-ray, and other medical technicians, etc., 
who produced the medical records for the screened litigants have 
been paid well in excess of $250 million by the law firms and screening 
companies that hired them.27 If that does not violate the Model Rule 
prohibiting lawyers from compensating or giving anything of value to 
a person who has recommended their services or soliciting employ-
ment from a client,28 then nothing does. 
It is not an overstatement to conclude that if a provision were 
added to the rules of professional conduct promulgated by state su-
preme courts that the rules would not apply to mass tort litigations, 
18 See Letter from Steven C. Krane, Chairman, Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof! Re-
sponsibility, Am. Bar Ass'n, to author (Feb. 27, 2008) (on file with author). 
19 See generally Lester Brickman, The Use of Litigation Screening in Mass Torts: A 
Formula for Fraud?, 61 SMU L. REv. 1221 (2008). 
20 See id. at 1226. 
2 1 See id. at 1227. 
22 See id. at 1313. 
23 See id. at 1228. 
24 See id. at 1313. 
25 See id. 
26 See id. 
21 See id. 
28 See Mo DEL RULES OF PRoF'L Co NDUCT R. 7.2(b), 7.3(a) (2008). 
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then actual practices in such litigations would remain unchanged. The 
Rules already are largely ignored by courts and by disciplinary agen-
cies-with one notable exception. Ironically, that one exception is 
Rule l.8(g), which the ALI now seeks to effectively amend. 
Rule 1.8(g) applies to aggregate settlements.29 In these nonclass 
aggregate litigations, lawyers solicit or otherwise obtain hundreds and 
even thousands of clients who have similar claims against a single de-
fendant, and typically charge contingency fees ranging from one-third 
to forty percent. Indeed, forty percent appears to have become the 
standard contingency fee in nonclass mass tort litigation.30 While the 
use of the class action device in certain mass torts has been circum-
scribed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Wind-
sor31 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corporation,32 another reason for 
bringing nonclass mass tort actions is that lawyers can charge fifty to 
one hundred percent higher fees than what they would be awarded in 
a class action. It strikes me as mind-boggling that commentators on 
nonclass mass tort litigations largely, if not entirely, ignore the fact 
that mass tort lawyers are charging contingency fees that even exceed 
the fees that lawyers charge in "retail" personal injury litigation-fees 
which are already excessive in many cases.33 United States District 
Court Judge Jack Weinstein, in a mass consolidation of thousands of 
individual actions against the manufacturer of the antidepressant 
Zyprexa, was critical of the failure of the lawyers to adjust their fees 
to reflect the huge economies of scale realized by the lawyers and 
slightly reduced the lawyers' forty-percent fees.34 Judge Weinstein 
reasoned that in mass torts, there is a special concern about excessive 
fees, which "can create a sense of overcompensation and reflect 
poorly on the court and its bar" and that " [p]ublic understanding of 
the fairness of the judicial process in handling mass torts ... is a signif-
29 See id. R. 1.8(g). 
30 See LESTER BRICKMAN, LAWYER BARONS: WHAT THEIR CONTINGENCY FEES R EALLY 
COST AMERICA 58, 60 (2011). 
31 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1996). 
32 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1998). 
33 For a discussion of contingency fees in ordinary tort litigation, see Lester Brickman, The 
Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation: Is It Price Competitive?, 25 CARDOZO L. 
REv. 65 (2003). 
34 In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 490 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). Judge 
Weinstein 's action incurred the wrath of Professors Charles Silver and Geoffrey P. Miller. See 
Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District 
Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 V AND. L. REv. 107, 110, 136-38 (2010). For my critique 
of the Silver-Miller argument, see BRICKMAN, supra note 30 (manuscript at 58-60) (on file with 
author). 
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icant aspect of complex national litigations involving thousands of par-
ties."35 A unique provision in the New Jersey state court rules 
purports to take economies of scale into account and significantly 
limit lawyers' fees in nonclass aggregate litigations.36 Lawyers need 
not worry, however; there is no evidence that this provision is ever 
complied with or that any steps have been taken to enforce it. 
Given the absence of any enforcement of reasonable fee provi-
sions in states' ethics codes, lawyers are free to (and do) realize wind-
fall fees of millions and even tens of millions of dollars in nonclass 
aggregate litigations.37 
Fees of this magnitude pose temptations that simply overwhelm 
any proclivity to adhere to ethics rules, and especially to the require-
ments set forth in Rule l.8(g). This risk is magnified exponentially 
when a lawyer sets out from the start to: (1) identify a defendant 
against whom colorable claims could be asserted, such as claims that 
an employer violated employment laws with regard to overtime or 
employment discrimination; (2) actively solicit employees of the de-
fendant-to-be to join in the litigation; (3) obtain a sufficient number of 
clients to command the attention of the employer; (4) file the claims 
and then enter into settlement negotiations with the employer; 
(5) structure an aggregate settlement whereby the employer will pay 
35 In re Zyprexa, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 493-94. 
36 The rules provide: 
When representation is undertaken on behalf of several persons whose respective 
claims . .. involve substantially identical liability issues, the contingent fee shall be 
calculated on the basis of the aggregate sum of all recoveries . . . and shall be 
charged to the clients in proportion to the recovery of each. 
N.J. CIV. PRAc . R. 1:21-7(i). Substantial savings to clients would result if, as the New Jersey rule 
provides, contingency fees were applied on the aggregate amount in mass settlements such as 
those that have frequently taken place in asbestos litigation. For example, if an attorney for 200 
plaintiffs reached a settlement with 5 defendants that provided for an aggregate payment of $48 
million (and it is allocated evenly among the clients so that each gets $240,000)-and the facts 
alleged would fall under the ambit of Rule 1:21-7(i), but the rule is ignored-then under New 
Jersey Civil Practice Rule 1:21-7(c)-which limits contingency fees in tort cases to 3311.io/o on the 
first $500,000, 30% on the next $500,000, 25% on the next $500,000, and 20% on any amounts in 
excess of $1.5 million-the total contingency fee would be $16 million. See id. R. l :21-7(c). 
However, if the fees are calculated pursuant to Rule 1:21-7(i), which would take into account the 
aggregate nature of the mass settlement, the total fee would be $9,741,667-39% less. Higher 
settlements involving larger numbers of clients will widen the spread between the Rule 1:21-7(c) 
fee and the Rule 1:21-7(i) fee. For example, if the number of clients in the settlement were 1000 
and each received $480,000, then the yield difference between the two fee calculations would 
approximate 40% . 
37 In the Phillips Petroleum aggregate settlement, contingency fees amounted to approxi-
mately $65 million. See infra text accompanying note 59. In the Nextel aggregate settlement, the 
fees totaled $5.5 million. See William H. Simon, The· Market for Bad Legal Advice: Academic 
Professional Responsibility Consulting as an Example, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1555, 1580 (2008). 
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either a set sum to be divided up by the lawyer among the clients or 
pay whatever sums are determined by an arbitration process; and 
(6) receive a contingency fee adding up to a substantial sum or agree 
to a substantial fee to be paid by the employer directly to the lawyer 
based upon the number of clients that accept the settlement. The 
. Florida Supreme Court said that by use of the latter provision, the 
lawyer "became an agent for [ the defendant] while still representing 
his ... clients against [the defendant]."38 This modus operandi 
roughly equates with that of the firm of Leeds, Morelli & Brown PC, 
described by William Simon in one of the most pathbreaking and cou-
rageous statements of conscience to ever appear in a law review.39 
The cure for this problem is not to be found in tinkering with the 
universality of the settlement. The problem is avarice, and the solu-
tion-if there is one-is not structural, but rather the threat of sanc-
tions not limited to loss of some or all of the fee and including a 
disciplinary component as well. While a handful of lawyers have been 
severely sanctioned for violating Rule 1.S(g),40 disciplinary agencies 
would appear to have a strong aversion to enforcing Rule 1.8(g) ab-
sent very compelling circumstances, such as highly visible criminal 
conduct.41 
One possible solution to curb lawyers' failures to adhere to the 
requirements of Rule 1.8(g) is to require that lawyers submit all aggre-
gate settlements for approval by a designated judicial official in the 
jurisdiction where the lawyer practices or where the calamity oc-
curred. 42 Alas, this proposal is unlikely to cure the problem of law-
yers' failures to adhere to Rule 1.8(g). Even were such a requirement 
38 Fla. Bar v. Rodriguez, 959 So. 2d 150, 160 (Fla. 2007). 
39 See Simon, supra note 37, at 1576-86. 
40 For descriptions of sanctions against lawyers for violating Rule 1.8(g), see Katherine 
Dirks, Ethical Rules of Conduct in the Settlement of Mass Torts: A Proposal to Revise Rule l.B(g) , 
83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 501, 515-16 (2008), and Sybil L. Dunlop & Steven D. Maloney, Justice Is 
Hard, Let's Go Shopping! Trading Justice for Efficiency Under the New Aggregate Settlement 
Regime, 83 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 521, 561 (2009). 
41 See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 3, at 983-89 (describing the Kentucky fen-phen settle-
ment and the criminal convictions that were obtained). 
42 The ALI proposal allows for limited judicial review of nonclass aggregate settlements 
when one of the clients seeks such review. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF AooREOATE Lrno. 
§ 3.18 (2010). A possible model for such a requirement is the New York Appellate Division rule 
requiring that lawyers file a copy of their contingency fee retainer agreements in personal injury 
and wrongful death cases with the state Office of Court Administration. See N.Y. CoMP. CooEs 
R. & Rsos. tit. 22, § 691.20(a)(l) (2011). Attorneys are also required to file a closing statement 
indicating the disposition of the claim, the gross amount received, the disbursements made, and 
the fee charged. Id. § 691.20(b). There is no indication, however, that the Office of Court Ad-
ministration reviews the forms filed. 
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adopted, we can anticipate that some lawyers would fail to file their 
settlements with a court, maintaining that they had not entered into 
an aggregate settlement even when they had done so. For example, in 
the Phillips Petroleum and fen-phen aggregate settlements, the plain-
tiffs' lawyers maintained that they had not entered into aggregate set-
tlements even though the clear weight of the evidence was that they 
had.43 Even when lawyers acknowledge that they have entered into 
an aggregate settlement, they may nonetheless claim that they made 
the necessary disclosures though their clients maintain that no such 
disclosures were made. 44 
In this brief Essay, I advance the view that lawyer adherence to 
ethical rules appears to be inversely related to the financial stakes for 
the lawyer. The aggregate settlement in the Phillips Petroleum explo-
sion-which I next explore-shows how the financial incentives, in 
the form of a $65 million fee, drove the lawyers to abandon adherence 
to the requirements of Rule l.8(g). It appears unlikely that the situa-
tion would have unfolded any differently had the settlement in Phil-
lips Petroleum provided that only ninety percent of the firm's clients 
would have to agree for the settlement to be effective. 
THE AGGREGATE SETTLEMENT IN THE 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM EXPLOSION 
On October 23, 1989, an explosion at the Phillips Petroleum 
Company's Houston plant killed twenty-three people and injured 
43 See In re N.Y. Diet Drug Litig., No. 700000/98, 2007 WL 969426, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Mar. 27, 2007) (discussing the fen-phen litigation); Peter Passell, Challenge to Multimillion-Dol-
lar Settlement Threatens Top Texas Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1995, at B6 (discussing the 
Phillips Petroleum case). In a proceeding before New York Supreme Court Judge Charles Ra-
mos, the issue whether the Jaw firm of Napoli Kaiser & Bern ("Napoli firm") entered into an 
aggregate settlement with Wyeth of 5000 claims for a reported $1 billion and whether it con-
formed to New York Disciplinary Rule 5-106, see N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, 
§ 1200.25 (2011), with regard to notifying its clients that there was an aggregate settlement and 
getting their informed consent, was determined. See In re N. Y. Diet Drug Litig., 2007 WL 
%9426, at *3-4. Though the Napoli firm maintained that it did not enter into an aggregate 
settlement and produced a legal ethics expert to support its position, Judge Ramos found that 
"[i]t is clearly a Jump sum collective or aggregate settlement." Id. at *4. Also under review was 
an allegation by the law firm of Parker & Waichman LLP, that when the Napoli firm allocated 
the settlement proceeds among its 5000 clients, it allocated disproportionately larger amounts to 
its own clients and lesser amounts to the clients referred to the firm by Parker & Waichman, so 
that the Napoli firm could capture contingency fees at the expense of Parker & Waichman. See 
Parker & Waichman v. Napoli, 815 N.Y.S.2d 71, 73-74 (App. Div. 2006), recalling and vacating 
806 N.Y.S.2d 19 (App. Div. 2005); see also Anthony DePalma, 9/11 Lawyer Made Name in Law-
suit on Diet Pills, N.Y. T1MES, Mar. 30, 2008, at A23. This discussion draws substantially from a 
prior article, Brickman, supra note 19, at 1265 n.198. 
44 See Simon, supra note 37, at 1590 (referring to the Nextel settlement). 
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hundreds.45 Phillips Petroleum was determined by the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") to have operated the 
plant in violation of OSHA safety standards and was fined. 46 Thus, 
there was not only no issue with regard to Phillips' liability for the 
explosion, but punitive damages were a distinct possibility.47 Indeed, 
one of the lead lawyers representing the victims testified that in his 
"thirty years-plus of practice [he] never had as good a set of liability 
facts to work with. "48 Phillips settled virtually all of the resulting 
claims for an amount said to exceed $400 million.49 Despite the pay-
out, Phillips was able to realize a net profit of $256 million from the 
explosion because of its casualty, property, and business interruption 
insurance.50 Most of the claimants came to be individually repre-
sented by three of the major plaintiffs' firms in Texas.51 One was the 
firm of Umphrey, Burrow, Reaud, Williams & Bailey ("Umphrey 
Burrow")-which was formed in 1988 by some of the leading Texas 
law firms to handle asbestos suits in the refinery-rich Houston ship 
channel area.52 The families of 126 Phillips employees-the lion's 
share of those with claims-were solicited by or directed to Umphrey 
Burrow by officials of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union, 
whose own lawyer was David Burrow.53 
45 See Passell, supra note 43. 
46 See Phillips 66 Co., 16 BNA OSHC 1332 (No. 90-1549, 1993). 
47 There was a possibility that compensation would be paid under the Texas workers' com-
pensation statutes. See TEx. LAB. CODE ANN.§§ 401-408 (West 2009). This would have materi-
ally reduced the amounts paid to the Phillips employees who were injured by the explosion but 
would also have reduced the risk born by the lawyers from negligible to nonexistent. As it 
turned out, given Phillips' egregious conduct, compensation was determined through the tort 
system. See Passell, supra note 43. 
48 Deposition of David Burrow at 189-90, Arce v. Burrow, No. 92-049658 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 
Feb. 5, 1995), 1995 WL 17856378. 
49 See Passell, supra note 43. 
50 Deposition of Cecil Jesse Silas at 280-81, Arce, No. 92-049658, 1995 WL 17856378. 
51 See Passell, supra note 43. 
52 Brenda Sapino, 'Super-Firm' Partners Profit Feud Nears Trial, TEX. LAW., May 2, 1994, 
at 1. At the time of the firm's formation, tens of thousands of mostly bogus asbestos claims were 
being filed in Texas courts by lawyers, mostly charging forty-percent contingency fees. See Les-
ter Brickman, On the Theory Class's Theories of Asbestos Litigation: The Disconnect Between 
Scholarship and Reality, 31 PEPP. L. REv. 33, 36, 64 (2003). For in-depth discussion of the issues 
of false claims that arise in such cases, see generally id.; Lester Brickman, Disparities Between 
Asbestosis and Silicosis Claims Generated by Litigation Screenings and Clinical Studies, 29 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 513 (2007). 
53 See Passell, supra note 43. (David Burrow is the "Burrow" in Umphrey Burrow.) Two 
days after the explosion, several Umphrey Burrow lawyers came to the union hall to sign up 
clients. See L.M. Sixel, Victims of Phillips Blast Assail Settlements, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 23, 1992, 
at lE. Other clients said they signed up with the firm after they were visited at home by a lawyer 
or after they were solicited by union shop stewards. Id. 
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Umphrey Burrow lawyers had little or no contact with their cli-
ents for almost a year. The litigation was largely in abeyance while a 
federal investigation ensued, though settlement negotiations were tak-
ing place.54 In February 1991, Umphrey Burrow's clients were sum-
moned to the firm's office to be told that Phillips had offered to settle 
each of the cases for sums ranging from $25,000 to $9.5 million.55 
Though the firm had initially demanded $271,605,000, apparently on 
the basis of adding up individual claims,56 a $190 million settlement 
was reached between Umphrey Burrow and Phillips after protracted 
negotiations.57 In exchange, Umphrey Burrow agreed not to litigate 
on behalf of any of its clients. The amount of the settlement was not 
arrived at by toting up individual settlements for each client, but 
rather was a lump sum, dictated by insurance availability, which the 
firm was to divide up as it saw fit. 58 The individual fee agreements 
between the firm and its clients provided for contingency fees of ei-
ther one-third or forty percent, amounting to approximately $65 mil-
lion. 59 The trick, then, was to convince the 126 clients to accept the 
amounts that the firm had allocated to them. Over a ten-day period, 
starting February 22, 1991, the 126 clients were called to the firm's 
office to be told the terms of the settlement in individual meetings 
with one of three lawyers, scheduled to last twenty minutes each.60 
54 Shortly after the explosion, the firm obtained an injunction that forced the company to 
allow union investigators onto the site. See Sixel, supra note 53. 
55 See Passell, supra note 43. 
56 See Letter from David H. Burrow, Attorney, Umphrey, Burrow, Reaud, Williams & 
Baily, to Otway Denny, Attorney, Fulbright & Jaworski (Dec. 17, 1990) (on file with author). 
57 See Passell, supra note 43. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. At least one of the clients stated that, though the retainer agreement she signed 
provided for a one-third contingency fee, the lawyer promised her that her fee would be reduced 
to between 20 and 25% if more clients signed up. Her fee was not reduced. See Interview with 
Julane Campbell in Hous., Tex. (Mar. 2, 1995). Another client asserted that he thought he 
signed a retainer agreement providing for a one-third fee but that he was charged a 40% fee. See 
Affidavit of Gary McPherson 'I 6, Arce v. Burrow, No. 92-049658 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Feb. 5, 1995), 
1995 WL 17856378 (on file with author). Still another client stated that, though he signed a 
blank fee contract, he was told the fee would be 25% of the recovery; he was charged 3316%. 
Affidavit of Stephen Bryant '1 6, Arce, No. 92-049658, 1995 WL 17856378 (Jan. 24, 1995) (on file 
with author) . My rough, back-of-the-envelope calculation is that, based on a $65 million fee and 
payment of $17 million in referral fees , the Umphrey Burrow lawyers ' effective hourly rate was 
approximately $20,000. 
60 See Passell, supra note 43. These meetings were quite perfunctory, and at least one 
client never actually met his attorney, Mr. Burrow. See Letter from Calvin Williams to Robert 
Nelson, Senior Investigator, State Bar of Tex. (on file with author) (claiming that Burrow did not 
handle his case as an individual case, and that he never actually met Burrow or spoke to him 
before signing a settlement agreement). 
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The lawyers told them that the amount had been the subject of indi-
vidual negotiations with Phillips; that it was the best offer they would 
get; that it was based on a review of their medical records, which had 
been obtained and evaluated; and requested that they sign the release 
form. In fact, the statements that the amounts were fixed in the 
course of negotiations with Phillips and were based on a review of 
their medical records were false. Not only was there an aggregate set-
tlement, but few of the clients' medical records had been accessed 
when these meetings took place.61 Twenty-five of the clients who ob-
jected were offered larger sums.62 These added amounts were "paid" 
for by reducing the amounts allocated to fifteen others.63 Those cli-
ents who objected were told that if they did not sign, the firm would 
not pursue their case in court and that if they hired other counsel, 
both firms would each be entitled to one-third of their recovery, leav-
ing them with only one-third.64 Those who still remained recalcitrant 
were brought before Texas District Court Judge Alice Oliver-Parrot, 
who told them that the settlement was fair and that if they turned it 
down, they would likely not fare as well.65 Before going on the bench 
61 See Affidavit of Roberta M. Edwards 'l'I 4-7, Arce, No. 92-049658, 1995 WL 17856378 
(Jan. 17, 1995) (on file with author); Sixel, supra note 53. 
62 See Final Settlements Chart, Arce, No. 92-049658, 1995 WL 17856378 (on file with 
author). 
63 See id. One client stated that he rejected the $36,000 that the firm offered and that it 
was then raised to $125,000. He stated that he was told by Ken Bailey that they took the money 
from someone else. Affidavit of Gary McPherson at 4, Arce, No. 92-049658, 1995 WL 17856378 
(on file with author). In a similar situation, another client had his offer raised from $375,000 to 
$475,000. See Letter from Silverrol Ferguson to State Bar of Texas (Apr. 11, 1991) (on file with 
author). A total of twenty-five clients had their final amounts increased by a total of $1 ,740,000, 
and fifteen clients had their amounts decreased by $1,155,000. See Injury Claims-Summary of 
Demands and Offers, Arce, No. 92-049658, 1995 WL 17856378 (on file with author). 
64 See Letter from Calvin Williams to Robert Nelson, supra note 60 (claiming that he was 
told that his offer "was a good offer and that I could not get any more and could not go to court" 
and that "he made me think that I had no other choice"); see also Brief of Appellants at 12-13, 
Arce v. Burrow, 958 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (No. 14-95-00360-CV) (collecting client 
recollections regarding alleged ploys used by the attorneys to secure the clients' agreements to 
the settlement, including being told that this was the best offer they would get; that trial would 
result in a smaller or no recovery; that if they were to use another attorney, the defendants 
would still take one-third in addition to what they would have to pay the second attorney; and 
that, in one case, salacious information about one.client's family would be introduced if the case 
went to trial). 
65 See Passell, supra note 43. Judge Oliver-Parrot's involvement in the case began when 
she was assigned as the trial judge in the case of Bogle v. Phillips Petroleum Co., No. 89-46055 
(151st Dist. Ct., Harris Cnty., Tex. 1991) (on file with author). At the time that Judge Oliver-
Parrot was the district court judge assigned to the Bogle case, her name was Alice Oliver 
Trevathan, and she was known as Alice Trevathan. All references to her in this Essay, however, 
identify her as Alice Oliver-Parrot-a name which she assumed subsequently. See Sixel, supra 
note 53. Judge Oliver-Parrot appointed Theodore Goller, for whom she had previously worked 
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in 1986, Judge Oliver-Parrot had joined the firm of Gibbons, Burrow 
& Bratton ("GBB") in 1981.66 During the time when Umphrey Bur-
row was bringing clients before her, she was receiving payments from 
the GBB law firm for her share of past work.67 
The firm's efforts largely succeeded, and all but a handful agreed 
to settle for a total of $190 million.68 The settlement, however, would 
at the law firm that was representing Phillips, to act as guardian ad !item for roughly 160 minor 
children of those who had suffered personal injury. See id. She then presided over hearings 
approving all of the settlements on behalf of the children. Those claims were all settled for $500 
for each of the children, with the money taken out of their parents' settlement amounts. See id. 
These settlements were sought by Phillips in order to terminate whatever claims the children had 
against Phillips. See id. Goller's investigation of the claims of these 160 children, which began 
on February 21, 1991, and ended on February 25, 1991, consisted of reviewing the medical 
records of five clients. Mr. Goller never spoke with the children, their parents, family or friends, 
or any counselors or healthcare providers. See id. For this work, Judge Oliver-Parrot approved 
payment to Goller of $60,000. See Check to Theodore Goller, Bogle, No. 89-46055 (on file with 
author). During the minors' hearings, Umphrey Burrow lawyers asked her to talk with other 
clients who did not have children. See Deposition of Alice Oliver-Parrot at 67, Arce, No. 92-
04%58, 1995 WL 17856378. She agreed, in response to the lawyers' requests for her assistance in 
closing the settlements, because "[she] liked all the lawyers in the case, so they knew [she'd] help 
them out" by having hearings on weekends and at night in order to accommodate their clients' 
work schedules. Id. at 66. She denies that she had been asked to convince the clients that they 
should accept the applicable settlement amounts that had been agreed to, but to "Li]ust tell them 
what the deal is. What's the settlement? What ... are we doing here?" Id. at 67. She stated 
that she advised them that since they hired their lawyers for their expertise, they should listen to 
their advice and that if they went to trial "you can get zero or you can get more. It's a gamble." 
Id. at 72. The judge insisted that "I never told anybody to settle their case. I told them, 'You do 
what you think is right, but listen to the lawyers, that's why you hire them."' Id. at 73. At one of 
the settlement hearings, a client testified that Ken Bailey had said that "[y]ou may get to 
meet .. . [Judge Oliver-Parrot] because she's going to have you down there to chew you out" if 
you refuse the settlement. Settlement Hearing at 10, Bogle, No. 89-46055 (on file with author). 
At that hearing, Judge Oliver-Parrot stated to that recalcitrant client: "Look, I'm telling you 
from the gut I'm afraid you're going to get nothing and then you will really think the system is 
horrible." Id. at 11. 
66 Deposition of Alice Oliver-Parrot at 6-7, Arce, No. 92-049658, 1995 WL 17856378. 
67 See id. at 10. In her deposition, Judge Oliver-Parrot was asked about the amount of 
these payments. She replied that she could not recall and that she had not maintained any 
records of the payments because of concerns of "confidentiality." Id. at 9-11. Though David 
Burrow was subpoenaed to supply copies of the checks, none were ever produced. See Deposi-
tion of David Burrow at 6-7, Arce, No. 92-049658, 1995 WL 17856378. One of the reasons that 
Umphrey Burrow was anxious to conclude a settlement with Phillips' insurance carrier was the 
concern that Judge Oliver-Parrot would be elevated to a higher court and would therefore "not 
be around" "to assist" the firm in "successfully convincing ... clients that they should take the 
applicable settlement amounts." Letter from Kenneth Bailey, Jr., to Blake Tartt and Otway 
Denny (Feb. 14, 1991) (on file with author). Two months after the settlement, Judge Oliver-
Parrot was appointed Chief Justice of Texas's First Court of Appeals. See Passell, supra note 43. 
Her deposition took place after this appointment. In 1994, she ran for the Texas Supreme Court 
and lost. See id. Umphrey Burrow contributed $80,000 to her campaign. See id. 
68 See Passell, supra note 43. 
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come to have an afterlife. Silverrol Ferguson, a thirty-nine-year-old 
mechanic at the plant, who had settled his claim for $500,000, had 
been angered by the firm's tactics and complained to the Texas Bar 
Association that the firm had done shoddy work, including failing to 
even obtain his medical records before the settlement showing the 
medical care he received after the explosion.69 The Texas Bar Associ-
ation determined that Mr. Burrow had not committed an ethical 
breach.7° Ferguson then attempted to hire a lawyer to attack the set-
tlement. No Texas lawyer, however, would take his case.71 
Ultimately, Ferguson hired William Skepnek,72 a Lawrence, Kan-
sas, trial lawyer, who, in 1992, brought a malpractice action against 
Umphrey Burrow on behalf of forty-six of the firm's clients.73 The 
complaint alleged a conflict of interest stemming from a "secret 
'agreement'" between the plaintiffs' lawyers and the defendant and its 
law firm, the existence of an aggregate settlement, and the failure to 
inform clients and obtain their informed consent to the aggregate set-
tlement.74 Skepnek moved for pro hac vice status.75 A year and a half 
later, days before the trial, Judge Mark Davidson turned down his re-
quest, delaying the trial.76 Skepnek then took the MPRE exam and 
successfully petitioned for admission to the Texas bar on grounds of 
69 See Letter from Silverrol Ferguson to the State Bar of Texas (Apr. 11, 1991) (on file 
with author). 
10 Letter from the State Bar of Texas to Silverrol Ferguson (Aug. 12, 1992) (on file with 
author) (stating that Burrow did not commit professional misconduct as defined by the Texas 
Code of Professional Responsibility); see also Letter from David H. Burrow to Robert E. Nel-
son, Senior Investigator, State Bar of Texas (Sept. 9, 1991) (on file with author) (responding to 
Ferguson's letter to the State Bar of Texas claiming that Burrow's office had treated Ferguson 
fairly and that the net settlement "was not only very fair, but extremely generous"). 
71 Peter Passell, Plaintiffs Win Right to Sue Lawyers in Malpractice Case, N .Y. TIMES, Sept. 
11, 1997, at A28. 
72 Skepnek would later take on the Texas firm of Baron & Budd over its use of a "script 
memo" to "implant false memories" in the minds of its asbestos clients resulting in the near 
demise of his professional career. For a detailed account of the "script memo" and Skepnek's 
courageous but probably foolhardy attempt to have the merits of the "script memo" adjudicated, 
see Brickman, supra note 52, at 141-66. This account became the subject of a micturating match 
between myself and Professor Charles Silver of The University of Texas School of Law. See 
generally Charles Silver, A Rejoinder to Lester Brickman: On the Theory Class 's Theories of 
Asbestos Litigation, 32 PEPP. L. REv. 765 (2005); Lester Brickman, A Rejoinder to the Rejoinder 
to On the Theory Class's Theories of Asbestos Litigation, 32 PEPP. L. REv. 781 (2005) (abstract 
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=761845). 
73 See Passell, supra note 43. 
74 See Plaintiffs' Second Amended Petition, Arce v. Burrow, No. 92-049658 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 
Feb. 5, 1995), 1995 WL 17856378. 
75 See Interview with William Skepnek in Hous., Tex. (Mar. 2, 1995). 
76 See id. 
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reciprocity with Kansas.77 After resumption of the trial, Judge David-
son granted the defendant's summary judgment motion, holding that 
while there was "sufficient evidence of an aggregate settlement ... to 
create a fact issue,"78 based upon the opinion of an expert witness for 
the firm which was contradicted by expert testimony for the plaintiffs, 
the plaintiffs could not show they had been damaged-that is, re-
ceived less than the amounts they would have received had their cases 
gone to trial.79 At least some explosion victims who were represented 
by other law firms obtained far more favorable settlements than did 
the Umphrey Burrow clients. The one death case represented individ-
ually was settled for $40 million-four times as much as the largest 
sum received by an Umphrey Burrow plaintiff.80 Carole Griffin, an 
Umphrey Burrow client who refused to accept her $150,000 offer, 
later hired another lawyer who negotiated a $797,000 settlement.81 
A panel of the Texas Court of Appeals overturned Judge David-
son's dismissal.82 Prior to oral arguments before a panel of the Texas 
Court of Appeals in March 1996, attorneys Umphrey, Reaud, and 
Williams reached confidential settlements in the malpractice case, 
leaving only Burrow and William's partner, F. Kenneth Bailey, Jr. , to 
soldier on. 83 
In 1999, in Burrow v. Arce,84 a shot heard around the bar, the 
Texas Supreme Court held that lawyers who breach their fiduciary du-
ties to their clients can be required to forfeit their fees even if the 
clients cannot show that they have suffered any actual damages.85 
77 See id. 
78 Arce, No. 92-049658, 1995 WL 17856378. 
79 See id. 
80 Jim Morris, Phillips Settlement Worth $40 Million, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 13, 1994, at lA. 
Bl Affidavit of Carol Griffin at 2, Arce, No. 92-049658, 1995 WL 17856378 (Jan. 16, 1995) 
( on file with author). 
82 Arce v. Burrow, 958 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997), affd in part, rev 'd in part, 997 
S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999) (holding that, while the plaintiffs were not entitled to actual damages, a 
question existed as to whether a breach of fiduciary duty took place with regard to the alleged 
failure to obtain the informed consent of their clients as mandated by the aggregate settlement 
rule, that fee forfeiture is an appropriate remedy in Texas for breach of fiduciary duty, and that 
plaintiffs were not required to prove actual damages, as proof of breach was sufficient). 
83 Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 234 (Tex. 1999). 
84 Id. 
ss Id. at 238-39 (holding that fee forfeiture is the appropriate remedy when there is a 
breach of fiduciary duty that does not result in actual damages because "[i]t is the agent's disloy-
alty, not any resulting harm, that violates the fiduciary relationship and thus impairs the basis for 
compensation. An agent's compensation is not only for specific results but also for loyalty"). 
The court found that the purpose of the remedy of fee forfeiture is to act as a deterrent to 
attorneys who may think to breach their duty of loyalty because "[t]he remedy of forfeiture 
removes any incentive for an agent to stray from his duty of loyalty based on the possibility that 
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Thereafter, Burrow also settled the case. All of the settlement 
amounts are confidential.86 
The actions by the attorneys in this nonclass aggregate settlement 
illustrate the powerful influence that a $65 million fee had on a quin-
tet of wealthy lawyers and possibly others involved in the litigation. 
Would their actions have been different if section 3.17 of the ALi's 
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation had been adopted in 
Texas? Perhaps. And then again, perhaps not. 
the principal will be unharmed or may have difficulty proving the existence or amount of dam-
ages." Id. To require proof of damages would therefore undermine the purpose of the remedy. 
See id. 
86 Arce v. Burrow, No. 92-49658, 2000 WL 35633123 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000). On 
November 19, 1992, Umphrey Burrow and all of its constituent attorneys filed suit against the 
Arce plaintiffs, William Skepnek, and others. See Plaintiff's Original Petition, Umphrey v. Arce, 
No. 92-52674 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 1992). They alleged that the Arce plaintiffs had committed perjury, 
violated court orders with respect to confidentiality and settlement agreements, and committed 
libel and slander. See id. They also claimed that the plaintiffs' lawyers had caused defamatory 
articles to appear in the Houston Chronicle and The National Law Journal, and had interfered 
with the attorney-client relationship existing between the plaintiffs in this action and their cli-
ents. See id. Finally the suit alleged that the Arce plaintiffs and their lawyers had engaged in a 
civil conspiracy. See id. Presumably, this suit was dismissed in the course of the various settle-
ments with Umphrey Burrow lawyers. 
